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ABSTRACT
In this research, we address the stability issues in Cooperative Data Exchange (CDE), 
one of the central problems in wireless network coding. We consider a setting in which the 
users are selfish, i.e., would like to maximize their own utility. More specifically, we 
consider a setting where each user has a subset of packets in the ground set X, and wants 
all other packets in X. The users can exchange data by broadcasting coded or uncoded 
packets over a lossless channel, and monetary transactions are allowed between any pair 
of users. We define the utility of each user as the sum of two sub-utility functions: (i) 
the difference between the total payment received by the user and the total transmission 
rate of the user, and (ii) the difference between the total number of required packets by 
the user and the total payment made by the user. A rate-vector and payment-matrix 
pair (r, p) is said to stabilize the grand coalition (i.e., the set of all users) if (r, p) is Pareto-
optimal over all minor coalitions (i.e., all proper subsets of users who collectively know 
all packets in X). Our goal is to design algorithms that compute a stabilizing rate-
payment pair with minimum total sum-rate and minimum total sum-payment for any 
given instance of the problem. In this work, we propose two algorithms that maximize the 
sum of utility of all users (over all solutions), and one of the algorithms also maximizes 
the minimum utility among all users (over all solutions). The second algorithm requires a 
broker, where each user has to trust the broker and use the broker to exchange payments, 
whereas in the first algorithm there is no such requirement. In the first algorithm, the users 
directly compensate user broadcasting the packet in that particular round. Our scheme 
minimizes the total number of transmitted packets, as well as the total amount of 
payments. We also perform an extensive simulation study to evaluate the performance of 
our scheme in practical setting.
ii
DEDICATION
To my family and friends
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Professor Alex Sprintson,
for all the support, inspiration and mentoring that he provided throughout the course of my
graduate studies. I would like to thank my co-advisor, Dr. Srinivas Shakkottai for all the
valuable guidance regarding my career, research and coursework. I greatly benefitted from
the informative discussions with both of them. I am grateful to Dr. Natarajan Gautam for
serving on my thesis committee.
I wish to express my sincere appreciation and thanks to Dr. Anoosheh Heidarzadeh for
mentoring me throughout the course of this thesis, being patient and allowing me to learn
gradually and steadily. All the useful discussions with him taught me about how to approach
a research problem, fragment it into smaller sub-problems and then most importantly, present
it in a succint, meaningful way.
A special thanks to all the current and past NAPA lab members for their support and the
valuable inputs.
Finally, I would like to thank my family, my friends, in College Station and in India, for
the constant encouragement and the unwavering belief.
This thesis, for all its worth, is dedicated to all of them.
iv
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES
Contributors
This work was supported by a thesis committee consisting of Professor Alex Sprintson
[advisor] and Professor Srinivas Shakkottai [co-advisor] of the Department of Electrical and
Computer Engineering and Professor Gautam Natarajan of the Department of Industrial and
Systems Engineering.
All the work conducted for the thesis was completed by the student in conjunction with
Visiting Assistant Professor Anoosheh Heidarzadeh of the Department of Electrical and
Computer Engineering.
Funding Sources
This work was done independently without outside financial support.
v
NOMENCLATURE
CDE Cooperative Data Exchange
P2P Peer-to-Peer
WSDE Weakly Secure Data Exchange
MAC Medium Access Control
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
IC Index Coding
MDS Maximum Distance Separable
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
NOMENCLATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
1. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1 CDE with Selfish Clients. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. STABILIZING COOPERATIVE DATA EXCHANGE PROBLEM.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1 Problem Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2 Proposed Algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3 Proof of theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE Page
1.1 Network Coding Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
3.1 Users in the initial setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2 User 1 transmits in the first round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3 User 2 transmits in the second round. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4 User 1 transmits again in the third round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5 mini∈N(p−i ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.6 maxi∈N(p−i ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.7 mini∈N(ui) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.8 vari∈N(p+i ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.9
∑
i∈N(ri) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.10 vari∈N(p−i ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
viii
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless technology has become the most sought after medium of gaining access to net-
work. The novel technique of network coding greatly improves the performance of wireless
networks. The traditional methods entail employing coding at the source nodes or the links
to protect against the erasures/losses or to compress the redundant information. The network
is handed the task of transmitting the information provided by the source nodes without any
modification. In contrast to the traditional approach, the network coding technique allows
for the mixing of the information received from different source nodes by the intermediary
network nodes.
Ahlswede et al. proposed the technique of network coding in their seminal work [1].
Their work detailed the advantages of employing network coding over the traditional network
operation methodology. All the packets are treated as the symbols of a finite field, which are
transmitted by the intermediary nodes in the form of a coded combination. In order to decode
the information in these coded combinations or to generate new packets, the receiving nodes
have to apply the field operations.
Figure 1.1: Network Coding Example
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Figure 1.1 shows how network coding can be used to reduce the number of transmissions
and henceforth, reduce the usage of network resources. This is an example showcasing
multicast network coding. Each link in the network is capable of transmitting a single packet
per channel use. Both the destination nodes, t1 and t2 need packets x1 and x2 from the
source node s. As shown in the figure, only one channel use can suffice the needs of both
the destination nodes, whereas, with the traditional routing approach, link (3,4) would have
to be used twice, to transfer x1 to t2 and x2 to t1.
It was shown in [2] that employing network coding can enhance the robustness of the net-
work in case of a link and node failure. After several intitial works on the wired networks,
network coding found its application in wireless networks following the work done by Katti
et al. [3]. They have introduced the opportunistic listening and opportunistic coding tech-
niques. In opportunistic listening, wireless receivers store all the packets, for a short interval
of time, transmitted over the wireless channel, regardless of packets’ destination. Whereas,
opportunistic coding is a strategy to improve network performance through coding by trans-
mitting coded packets during the appropriate time slots. Following their seminal work, a lot
of research has has been done in inspecting the advantages of network coding in wireless
networks and the improvements in the network performance.
In this work, we shall go through the problem of Cooperative Data Exchange (CDE) in
wireless networks with selfish users. El Rouayheb et al. [4] first proposed the CDE prob-
lem. It is a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) method of exchanging information, over a broadcast channel,
among wireless clients. We consider the game-theoretic perspective of the CDE problem.
We allow monetary transaction between the players. In our setting, each player has a utility
function that captures the value fo the information gained through the exchange as well as
the transmission cost. The problem is to find a rate schedule, i.e. the transmissions rate for
each user, and a payment schedule, i.e. the payment made and received by each user during
the transmission, to stabilize the grand coalition (i.e., set of all users). We propose two algo-
rithms, each of which finds a solution that guarantees the stability of grand coalition for any
2
instance. Both algorithms maximize the sum utility of all users, while one also maximizes
the minimum utility among all users.
3
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 1
2.1 Background
Past few years have seen a lot of research being done in the field of cooperative commu-
nication in wireless networks. Cooperative communication can help us achieve space-time
diversity, increased coverage, better data rates and energy efficiency. This kind of communi-
cation has the following advantages:
• Due to topological proximity of terminals, the transmissions within the close group
of users is more reliable as compared to the transmission from the base station to any
terminal,
• Local communication has a smaller footprint, hence allowing the user to utilize re-
sources freely without interfering with the resources of the base station,
• Even if the connection with the base station is either too weak or unavailable after
the initial phase of transmission, the users can communicate over the local network to
recover the files.
The original setting of this problem considers a peer-to-peer data exchange scenario over
a lossless broadcast channel. There is a group N of users and a ground set X of packets.
Each user knows a subset of packets in X , and wants to learn the rest of packets in X . The
users exchange their packets by broadcasting coded or uncoded versions of their packets,
and the problem is to find a solution (i.e., the transmission rate of each user and the set of
packets transmitted by each user) such that all users achieve omniscience with minimum
total sum-rate. In this work, we revisit the CDE problem from a game-theoretic perspective
where all users are selfish.
1*Reprinted with permission from “A Monetary Mechanism for Stabilizing Cooperative Data Exchange
with Selfish Users” by A. Heidarzadeh, I. Tyagi, S. Shakkottai, and A. Sprintson, 2018, in Proc. IEEE ISIT’
18, Jun. 2018 ©2018 IEEE.
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2.1.1 CDE with Selfish Clients
In this setting, there can be a monetary transaction between any pair of users, and the util-
ity function of each user is defined as the sum of two sub-utility functions as follows: (i) the
difference between the total payment the user receives from other users and its transmission
rate, and (ii) the difference between the total number of packets the user wants and the total
payment it makes to other users. Thinking of the sum of the transmission rate and the total
payment being made by each user as its cost for participating in the exchange session, and
thinking of the sum of the number of packets each user learns and the total payment being
received by the user as its gain due to its participation in the exchange session, the utility
function of each user is the surplus of the user.
The problem is to find a rate schedule {ri}i∈N and a payment schedule {pi,j}i,j∈N for
the grand coalition (i.e., the set of all users) to achieve omniscience all together that is
Pareto optimal, with respect to the utility function, over all minor coalitions (i.e., any proper
subset of users who collectively know all packets in X). That is, a pair ({ri}i∈N , {pi,j}i,j∈N)
is a solution if there is no pair ({r˜i}i∈S, {p˜i,j}i,j∈S) for any minor coalition S to achieve
omniscience together such that the utility of some user(s) in S is strictly greater, and the
utility of no user in S is less. Note that a solution stabilizes the grand coalition in that no
minor coalition has incentive to break the grand coalition. The goal is to find a solution that
minimizes the total sum-rate and the total sum-payment simultaneously.
In this work, we propose two algorithms, each of which finds a solution for any problem
instance. Moreover, we show that both algorithms maximize the sum of utility of all users
(over all solutions), and one of the algorithms also maximizes the minimum utility among
all users (over all solutions).
2.2 Related Work
Since the seminal work by Ahlswede et al. [1], the field of network coding has much
evolved. Starting work focused mainly on network code construction for multicast networks,
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modeled as graph with one or more source nodes and multiple sink nodes. The amount of
work being done in wireless network applications of network coding is far less as compared
to work done in wired networks. The most conventional ways of increasing throughput
in wireless networks are mostly related to making the routing protocols more efficient or
modifying the trannsport or MAC protocols [5–7]. Deb et al. [8] and Lun et al. [9] first
explored the network coding applications in wireless network systems. However, both of the
papers employed algorithms developed for wired multicast networks and hence, remained
far from the problems specific to the wireless systems. Katti et al. [3], [10] made the first
major breakthrough in the wireless network coding. They have proposed algorithms that
leverage the broadcast nature of wireless networks. Specifically, they propose a framework
in which wireless devices listen to packets sent by the neighboring devices, irrespective of
the packets’ destinations. This technique is called opportunistic listening. With the help of
a coding scheme that can take advantage of this information, devices can improve the over-
all throughput by combining packets from various sources. The corresponding technique is
called opportunistic coding. Both these techniques laid the foundation for network coding
schemes in wireless domain, which could effectively utilize the broadcast properties of wire-
less channel. Authors in [11], propose different optimal opportunistic coding algorithms for
various mesh networks. Settings with one-hop networks, consisting of only two nodes ex-
changing packets among themselves and one node capable of sending and receiving packets
from both nodes, were studied in [12–15].
Another problem which received very wide attention from the researchers, first intro-
duced in the context of satellite networks by Birk et al. in [16, 17], is Index Coding (IC).
The clients in IC have some prior information through opportunistic learning and are in need
of certain packets. The base station transmitting to the clients, can take advantage of the
knowledge of the clients and in turn, can reduce the total transmissions required. After [17],
researchers developed great insight into the properties of IC and followed with many papers.
Bar-Yossef et al. [18] formulated IC as a graph theory problem. IC was eventually proved to
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be an NP-hard problem in [19] which is hard to approximate in [20].
Similar to IC, CDE is a setting of wireless network coding problem which employs op-
portunistic coding and listening. The side information present with the CDE clients is ac-
quired through the technique of opportunistic learning. However, unlike IC, the clients in
CDE perform opportunistic coding in order to get all of the required information with min-
imum transmission cost. After being first proposed by Rouayheb et al. [4], much work has
been done with respect to the algorithms for this problem [21–24]. Reference [21] provided
the randomized algorithm and [22] proposed the deterministic algorithm for CDE problem.
Reference [23] gave a divide-and-conquer method to find the optimal coding strategy. A
different version of the problem was given in [24], where fractional packets were considered
and hence, submodularity property of the cut-set bounds was employed. Work in [25–27]
examined cost, fairness and multi-hop network topology w.r.t. CDE. CDE is related to the
secret key agreement problem, formulated in [28], in [29].
A coalition-game model for the CDE problem was recently proposed in [30]. This model
differs from our work in two aspects: (i) the utility function is different from ours, and (ii)
the criteria for the stability of the grand coalition is different from the Pareto optimality
considered here.
Recently, in [31], there was some work being done on a related problem, where each
user has two utility functions: its rate and its delay. They defined the stability of the grand
coalition via the Pareto optimality with respect to both the rate and delay functions simul-
taneously. The researchers showed that over all the minor coalitions there does not exist
any non-monetary mechanism (without the peer-to-peer payments) that stabilizes the grand
coalition for all problem instances. This result is the motivation of this work on the design
of a monetary mechanism for stabilizing the grand coalition for any problem instance.
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3. STABILIZING COOPERATIVE DATA EXCHANGE PROBLEM 1
3.1 Problem Setup
We consider the original setting of the cooperative data exchange (CDE) problem as
follows. Consider a group of n users and a set of k packets X , {x1, . . . , xk}. Let N ,
{1, . . . , n} and K , {1, . . . , k}. Initially, each user i ∈ N has a subset Xi of the packets in
X , and ultimately, the user i wants the rest of the packets X i , X \ Xi. The index set of
packets in Xi for each user i is known by all other users. Also, without loss of generality, we
assume that X = ∪i∈NXi. The objective of all users is to achieve omniscience, i.e., to learn
all packets in X , via exchanging their packets by broadcasting (coded or uncoded) packets.
A subset S of users in N is a coalition if ∪i∈SXi = X . We refer to any coalition S ⊂ N
as a minor coalition, and refer to the coalition N as the grand coalition. Whenever we use
the notation S for a subset of users, we assume that S is a coalition, unless explicitly noted
otherwise.
LetZ+ be the set of non-negative integers. For any S ⊆ N , a rate vector r , [r1, . . . , rn] ∈
Zn+ is S-omniscience-achieving if there exists a transmission scheme with each user i ∈ S
transmitting ri (coded or uncoded) packets such that all users in S achieve omniscience, re-
gardless of transmissions of the rest of the users. Note that, for any S-omniscience-achieving
rate vector, random linear network coding (over a sufficiently large finite field) suffices as
a transmission scheme for all users in S to achieve omniscience (with any arbitrarily high
probability) [25].
For any S ⊆ N , we denote by RS the set of all S-omniscience-achieving rate vectors r
such that ri = 0 for all i 6∈ S. For any arbitrary subset S ⊆ N and any rate vector r, we
define the sum-rate rS ,
∑
i∈S ri and r∅ , 0. By a standard network coding argument [25],
for any S ⊆ N , r ∈ RS iff rS˜ ≥ | ∩j∈S\S˜ Xj|, for every (non-empty) S˜ ⊂ S.
1*Reprinted with permission from “A Monetary Mechanism for Stabilizing Cooperative Data Exchange
with Selfish Users” by A. Heidarzadeh, I. Tyagi, S. Shakkottai, and A. Sprintson, 2018, in Proc. IEEE ISIT’
18, Jun. 2018 ©2018 IEEE.
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We consider CDE under a monetary mechanism where there can be a payment from any
user to any other user. For all i, j ∈ N , let pi,j ≥ 0 be the total payment from the user i
to the user j, and let pi,i = 0. For a payment matrix p , [pi,j], let p+i ,
∑
j∈N\{i} pj,i
and p−i ,
∑
j∈N\{i} pi,j be the total incoming payment of the user i and the total outgoing
payment of the user i, respectively.
For any S ⊆ N , we denote by PS the set of all payment matrices p such that pi,j = 0 and
pj,i = 0 for all i ∈ S, j 6∈ S, i.e., there is no incoming payment to any user in S from any user
out of S and there is no outgoing payment from any user in S to any user out of S. For any
S ⊆ N , we define the sum-payment pS ,
∑
i,j∈S pi,j . Note that
∑
i∈S p
+
i =
∑
i∈S p
−
i = pS
for all p ∈ PS .
Definition 1 (Utility). For any S ⊆ N , any r ∈ RS , and any p ∈ PS , the utility of each user
i ∈ S is given by
ui(r, p) , (p+i − ri) + (|X i| − p−i ),
where u+i (r, p) , p+i − ri is the net utility due to the user i’s contribution to the system, and
u−i (r, p) , |X i| − p−i is the net utility due to the system’s contribution to the user i.
Note that the cost per transmission and the value per packet are assumed to be unity for
all users.
The two functions u+i (r, p) and u
−
i (r, p) motivate the notion of rationality defined as
follows.
Definition 2 (Rationality). For any S ⊆ N , any r ∈ RS and any p ∈ PS , the rate-payment
pair (r, p) is rational if u+i (r, p) ≥ 0 and u−i (r, p) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S.
Hereafter, we focus on the rational rate-payment pairs only, and omit the term “rational”
for brevity.
We assume that all the users are selfish, i.e., each user may or may not agree with its rate
specified by a rate vector or its payments specified by a payment matrix. The goal is to find a
9
rate-payment pair (r, p), r ∈ RN and p ∈ PN , under which N is stable. We formally define
the notion of stability based on the utility function as follows.
Definition 3 (Stability). For any rate-payment pair (r, p), r ∈ RN and p ∈ PN , N is (r, p)-
stable if there is not a rate-payment pair (r˜, p˜), r˜ ∈ RS , and p˜ ∈ PS , for some S ⊂ N , such
that
• ui(r, p) ≤ ui(r˜, p˜) for all i ∈ S, and
• ui(r, p) < ui(r˜, p˜) for some i ∈ S.
The (r, p)-stability of the grand coalition is equivalent to the Pareto optimality of (r, p)
over all minor coalitions.
Definition 4 (Feasibility). A rate-payment pair (r, p) is feasible if N is (r, p)-stable.
Note that a feasible solution guarantees that no minor coalition of users has incentive to
break the grand coalition.
Definition 5 (Optimality). A feasible (r, p) is optimal if there is not a feasible (r˜, p˜) such that
rN > r˜N or pN > p˜N .
Note that, for an optimal solution, the sum-rate and the sum-payment are minimum
among all feasible solutions.
The problem is to determine if an optimal solution exists for any given instance, and if
so, to find such a solution.
3.2 Proposed Algorithms
Algorithm 1
In this section, we present an algorithm that, for any given instance, finds an optimal
solution.
The algorithm begins with an all-zero rate vector r = [ri]i∈N and an all-zero payment
matrix p = [pi,j]i,j∈N , operates in rounds, and updates r and p over the rounds.
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Algorithm 1: Algo1(n, k, {Ui}ni=1, Fq)
1 N ← {1, . . . , n}, K ← {1, . . . , k}
2 ri ← 0 ∀i ∈ N , pi,j ← 0 ∀i, j ∈ N
3 l← 1, V0 ← ∅
4 while dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1) < k for some i ∈ N do
5 Tl ← {i ∈ N : dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1) = maxi∈N dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1)}
6 Select an arbitrary user t ∈ Tl
7 Rl ← {i ∈ N : Ut 6⊆ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1)}
8 Select an encoding vector vl ∈ Fkq such that vil = 0 ∀{i ∈ K : ui 6∈ Ut} and
vl 6∈ span(∪i∈RlUi ∪ Vl−1)
9 Have the user t transmit the packet yl =
∑
i∈K v
i
lxi
10 rt ← rt + 1
11 pi,t ← pi,t + 1/|Rl| ∀i ∈ Rl
12 Vl ← Vl−1 ∪ vl
13 l← l + 1
14 end
15 return r = [ri]i∈N and p = [pi,j]i,j∈N
For any (uncoded) packet xi, i ∈ K, denote the (unit) encoding vector of xi by ui ,
[u1i , . . . , u
k
i ], where u
i
i = 1 and u
j
i = 0 for all j 6= i. For any (linearly coded) packet
yj ,
∑
i∈K v
i
jxi, where v
i
j ∈ Fq (for some finite field Fq), denote the encoding vector of yj
by vj , [v1j , . . . , vkj ].
Let Ui be the set of (unit) encoding vectors of packets inXi, and Vl be the set of encoding
vectors of all packets being transmitted by the end of the round l. Let V0 , ∅. We refer to
span(Ui ∪ Vl) and dim(Ui ∪ Vl) as the knowledge and the size of knowledge of the user i
at the end of the round l, respectively, where span(V) and dim(V) denote the vector space
of (linear) span (over Fq) of a collection V of vectors in Fkq and the dimension of span(V),
respectively.
Consider an arbitrary round l > 0. Let Tl be the set of all users iwith maximum dim(Ui∪
Vl−1). In the round l, the algorithm first selects an arbitrary user t ∈ Tl, and then the user
t constructs (using its uncoded packets) and broadcasts a (coded) packet yl (with encoding
vector vl).
Let Rl be the set of all users i such that Ut 6⊆ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1). The encoding vector
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vl of the packet yl satisfies two conditions: (i) vil = 0 ∀{i ∈ K : ui 6∈ Ut}, and (ii)
vl 6∈ span(∪i∈RlUi ∪ Vl−1). (Such a vector vl ∈ Fkq always exists and it can be found in
polynomial time using a randomized or a deterministic algorithm so long as q ≥ n · k or
q ≥ n, respectively [21].) Note that Rl is the set of all users i whose knowledge at the
beginning of the round l is not a superset of (initial) knowledge of the transmitting user t,
and the encoding vector vl of the packet yl being transmitted by the user t in the round l is
not known to any user i ∈ Rl at the beginning of the round l. Thus, the transmission of the
packet yl increases the size of knowledge of any user i ∈ Rl by one, and it does not change
that of any user i 6∈ Rl.
Next, the algorithm increments rt by 1 and increments pi,t by 1/|Rl| for all i ∈ Rl. At
the end of the round l, the algorithm augments Vl−1 by vl, and constructs Vl, i.e., Vl =
Vl−1 ∪ {vl}. The rounds continue until the size of knowledge all users is k. Once the
algorithm terminates, it returns the rate vector r and the payment matrix p.
Example below shows how this algorithm works for a group of users with side informa-
tion. Consider a group of 4 users and a set of 6 packets, {x1, . . . , x6}. Each figure below has
the want-set, packets required by that user to gain access to the complete file, written inside
it. For example, user 1 here has packet x1 in its want-set or in other words, has access to
packets in X1 = {x2, . . . , x6}. Each user i will start with its own subset Xi and wants the
packets in Xi. The index set of packets available to each user is known by the other users.
Want-sets written in red depict the users who are still incomplete and those in black belong
to the users who have gained access to all the packets/become complete by that moment.
Rate vector, payment matrix and utility vector belonging to this CDE are, r = [2, 1, 0, 0],
p =
[
0, 1
3
, 0, 0; 1
3
, 0, 0, 0; 5
6
, 1
3
, 0, 0; 5
6
, 1
3
, 0, 0
]
, u(r, p) = [2
3
, 2
3
, 11
6
, 11
6
], respectively.
Theorem 1. The output of Algorithm 1 is optimal.
Algorithm 2
In this section, we present an algorithm that for any given instance provides an optimal
solution with maximum sum-utility and maximum min-utility among all optimal solutions.
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Figure 3.1: Users in the initial setting
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Figure 3.2: User 1 transmits in the first round
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Figure 3.3: User 2 transmits in the
second round
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Figure 3.4: User 1 transmits again in the third
round
Algorithm 2 is similar to Algorithm 1, and the only difference is in the set of users that
make payments and the update rule of the payments in each round. We assume that there is a
broker that collects the payment p−i by each user i, and returns the payment p
+
i to each user
i. The algorithm begins with all-zero payment vectors p+ and p−, and updates these vectors
over the rounds as follows. Consider an arbitrary round l > 0. Let Pl be the set of users
with maximum |X i| − p−i . Assuming that the user t transmits in the round l, the algorithm
increments p+t by 1 and increments p
−
i by 1/|Pl| for all i ∈ Pl.
In the example shown for algorithm 1, if we run algorithm 2, the rate vector, payment
vectors and utility vector are, r = [2, 1, 0, 0], p+ = [2, 1, 0, 0], p− = [0, 0, 3
2
, 3
2
], u(r, p) =
[1, 1, 3
2
, 3
2
], respectively.
Theorem 2. The output of Algorithm 2 is optimal. Moreover, the output of Algorithm 2 has
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Algorithm 2: Algo2(n, k, {Ui}ni=1, Fq)
1 N ← {1, . . . , n}, K ← {1, . . . , k}
2 ri ← 0, p+i ← 0, p−i ← 0 ∀i ∈ N
3 l← 1, V0 ← ∅
4 while dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1) < k for some i ∈ N do
5 Tl ← {i ∈ N : dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1) = maxi∈N dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1)}
6 Pl ← {i ∈ N : |X i| − p−i = maxi∈N(|X i| − p−i )}
7 Select an arbitrary user t ∈ Tl
8 Rl ← {i ∈ N : Ut 6⊆ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1)}
9 Select an encoding vector vl ∈ Fkq such that vil = 0 ∀{i ∈ K : ui 6∈ Ut} and
vl 6∈ span(∪i∈RlUi ∪ Vl−1)
10 Have the user t transmit the packet yl =
∑
i∈K v
i
lxi
11 rt ← rt + 1
12 p+t ← p+t + 1
13 p−i ← p−i + 1/|Pl| ∀i ∈ Pl
14 Vl ← Vl−1 ∪ vl
15 l← l + 1
16 end
17 return r = [ri]i∈N and p = [p+i , p
−
i ]i∈N
maximum sum-utility and maximum min-utility among all optimal solutions.
3.3 Proof of theorems
Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we reserve the notations r and p for the outputs of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 1. (r, p) is rational (i.e., p+i ≥ ri and |X i| ≥ p−i for all i ∈ N ).
Proof. By the procedure of Algorithm 1, p+i = ri since the user i receives one unit of
payment for each transmission it makes, and |X i| ≥ p−i since the user i pays at most one
unit for each transmission that increases its size of knowledge, and it does not pay for any
other transmission.
Let Ns be the sth subset of users that achieve omniscience simultaneously, and let ls be
the round at which the users in Ns achieve omniscience. Note that the sets Ns are disjoint.
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Denote by N (s) the set of all users in N1, . . . , Ns. Let m be such that N (m) = N . By using
similar ideas as in the proof of [31, Lemma 4], the following result can be shown.
Lemma 2. For any s ∈ [m] and any S ⊆ N (s) such that S ∩ Ns 6= ∅, we have ls ≤ r˜S for
all r˜ ∈ RS .
Proof. Fix an arbitrary s ∈ [m]. Fix an arbitrary S ⊆ N (s) such that S ∩Ns 6= ∅, and an
arbitrary r˜ ∈ RS . Let {yl}1≤l≤ls be the set of the algorithm’s choice of packets being trans-
mitted from the round 1 to the round ls, and let {vl}1≤l≤ls be the set of encoding vectors of
these packets.
For any S ⊆ N , we say that a set of packets is S-transmittable if the encoding vector of
each packet in the set lies in span(Ui) for some i ∈ S. Let ` , min(r˜S, ls). We prove by
induction (on l) that, for every 1 ≤ l ≤ `, there exists an S-transmittable set of r˜S − l + 1
packets such that if they were transmitted after the transmission of all the packets in the set
{y1, . . . , yl−1}, then S achieves omniscience.
For the base case of l = 1, there exists an S-transmittable set of r˜S packets such that
if they were transmitted, then S achieves omniscience (since r˜ ∈ RS). Next, consider an
arbitrary round l, 1 < l ≤ `. Fix the set of packets Y = {y1, . . . , yl−1}. By the induction
hypothesis, there exists an S-transmittable set of r˜S − l + 1 packets such that if they were
transmitted after the transmission of Y , then S achieves omniscience. Let Y˜ , {y˜l, . . . , y˜r˜S}
and V˜ , {v˜l, . . . , v˜r˜S} be such a set of packets and the set of their encoding vectors, re-
spectively. Assume that the algorithm selects the user t, which may or may not be in S, to
transmit in the round l.
Since
dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1) ≥ k − r˜S + l − 1
for all i ∈ S (noting that, after the transmission of Y ∪ Y˜ , S achieves omniscience), and
dim(Ut ∪ Vl−1) ≥ dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1)
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for all i ∈ N (noting that, in the round l, the size of the knowledge of the user t is greater
than or equal to that of any other user i ∈ N ), then
dim(Ut ∪ Vl−1) ≥ k − r˜S + l − 1.
If
dim(Ut ∪ Vl−1) = k − r˜S + l − 1,
then the user t cannot transmit in the round l since the user t needs the set of all the packets
in Y˜ so as to achieve omniscience. This is, however, a contradiction (by assumption). Thus,
dim(Ut ∪ Vl−1) > k − r˜S + l − 1,
and consequently, Y˜ contains some packet y˜ such that its encoding vector v˜ ∈ span(Ut ∪
Vl−1). Fix such a packet y˜ and its encoding vector v˜. Note that, after the transmission of
Y ∪ Y˜ \ {y˜}, the user t achieves omniscience (i.e., dim(Ut ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) = k), and
any user i ∈ S, i 6= t, needs no more than one packet so as to achieve omniscience (i.e.,
dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) ≥ k − 1 for all i ∈ S, i 6= t). (The deletion of one packet
decreases the size of knowledge of any user by at most one.)
Consider an arbitrary i ∈ S, i 6= t. We consider two cases: (i) vl ∈ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}),
and (ii) vl 6∈ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}). In the case (i), since
vl ∈ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜})
and
vl ∈ span(Ut ∪ Vl−1),
then
span(Ut ∪ Vl−1) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}),
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or equivalently,
span(Ut ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}).
Thus,
dim(Ut ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) ≤ dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}),
or equivalently,
dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) = k
since
dim(Ut ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) = k.
Thus, after the transmission of Y ∪ Y˜ \ {y˜}, the user i achieves omniscience. In the case (ii),
since
vl 6∈ span(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜})
and
dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) ≥ k − 1,
then
dim(Ui ∪ Vl−1 ∪ {vl} ∪ V˜ \ {v˜}) = k.
Thus, after the transmission of Y ∪{yl}∪Y˜ \{y˜}, the user i achieves omniscience. By (i) and
(ii), it follows that S achieves omniscience after the transmission of Y ∪ {yl} ∪ Y˜ \ y˜. Thus,
there exists an S-transmittable set of r˜S − l packets Y˜ \ y˜ such that if they were transmitted
after the transmission of Y ∪ yl, then S achieves omniscience. This completes the inductive
proof.
From the above result, it follows that S achieves omniscience by the algorithm’s choice
of packets {yl}1≤l≤` being transmitted from the round 1 to the round `. Now there are two
cases: (i) ls > r˜S , and (ii) ls ≤ r˜S . In the case (i), ` = r˜S , and hence, all users in S must
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achieve omniscience by the round ` (= r˜S). This is, however, a contradiction since some
user(s) in S, particularly any user in S ∩Ns, achieves omniscience in the round ls (> `) (by
definition). Note that S ∩ Ns 6= ∅ (by assumption). In the case (ii), ` = ls, and the lemma
follows directly. This completes the proof.
Lemma 3. (r, p) is feasible (i.e., N is (r, p)-stable).
Proof. The proof follows by contradiction. Suppose that (r, p) is not feasible (i.e., N is
not (r, p)-stable). Thus, there exists r˜ ∈ RS and p˜ ∈ PS for some S ⊂ N such that
ui(r, p) ≤ ui(r˜, p˜) for all i ∈ S, and ui(r, p) < ui(r˜, p˜) for some i ∈ S. Thus,
∑
i∈S
ui(r˜, p˜) >
∑
i∈S
ui(r, p).
Note that ∑
i∈S
ui(r˜, p˜) =
∑
i∈S
p+i −
∑
i∈S
r˜i +
∑
i∈S
|X i| −
∑
i∈S
p−i .
Since
∑
i∈S p
+
i =
∑
i∈S p
−
i for all p ∈ PS , then
∑
i∈S
ui(r˜, p˜) =
∑
i∈S
|X i| −
∑
i∈S
r˜i.
Since ri = p+i for all i ∈ N , then
∑
i∈S ri =
∑
i∈S p
+
i . Thus,
∑
i∈S
ui(r, p) =
∑
i∈S
|X i| −
∑
i∈S
p−i .
Putting these arguments together, we get
∑
i∈S
p−i >
∑
i∈S
r˜i. (3.1)
Let s ∈ [m] be such that S ⊆ N (s) and S ∩ Ns 6= ∅. Note that all the users in S achieve
omniscience by the round ls. By the structure of the proposed algorithm, one unit of payment
18
is made in each round (each user in Rl pays 1/|Rl| units of payment in the round l), and no
user pays in any round after it achieves omniscience (if the user i is complete at the beginning
of the round l, then i 6∈ Rl). Thus, it is easy to see that
∑
i∈S
p−i ≤ ls.
Moreover, by the result of Lemma 2, it follows that
ls ≤
∑
i∈S
r˜i
for all r˜ ∈ RS . By combining these two inequalities, we get
∑
i∈S
p−i ≤
∑
i∈S
r˜i. (3.2)
By comparing (3.1) and (3.2), we arrive at a contradiction. Thus, N is (r, p)-stable, as was
to be shown.
Lemma 4 ( [21]). For any r˜ ∈ RN , we have r˜N ≥ rN .
Proof. The proof can be found in [21].
Lemma 5. (r, p) is optimal (i.e., there is not a feasible (r˜, p˜) such that rN > r˜N or pN > p˜N ).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary feasible (r˜, p˜), r˜ ∈ RN and p˜ ∈ PN . We shall show that
r˜N ≥ rN and p˜N ≥ pN . By Lemma 4, r˜N ≥ rN for all r˜ ∈ RN . Since (r˜, p˜) is feasible,
then (r˜, p˜) is rational. Thus, p˜+i ≥ r˜i for all i ∈ N , and consequently, p˜N ≥ r˜N . Note that
pN = rN since p+i = ri. Thus, p˜N ≥ r˜N ≥ rN = pN . This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we reserve the notations r and p for the outputs of Algorithm 2.
Lemma 6. (r, p) is rational.
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Proof. Let ri(l), p+i (l), and p
−
i (l) be ri, p
+
i , and p
−
i at the end of the round l−1, respectively.
Note that ri = ri(lm + 1), p+i = p
+
i (lm + 1), and p
−
i = p
−
i (lm + 1). We will show that
p+i (l) ≥ ri(l) and |X i| ≥ p−i (l) for all i ∈ N and all l ∈ [lm + 1]. Fix an arbitrary
l ∈ [lm + 1]. By the procedure of Algorithm 2, p+i (l) = ri(l), and particularly, p+i = ri. We
next show that |X i| ≥ p−i (l). The proof follows by contradiction. Suppose that |X i| < p−i (l)
for some i. Note that
max
i∈N
|X i| − p−i (l) = k −min
i∈N
(|Xi|+ p−i (l)).
Thus,
Pl = {i ∈ N : |Xi|+ p−i (l) = min
i∈N
(|Xi|+ p−i (l))}.
By the procedure of Algorithm 2, |Xi|+ p−i (l) are the same for all i such that p−i (l) > 0, and
|Xi| + p−i (l) = |Xi| ≤ k for all i such that p−i (l) = 0. Since |Xi| + p−i (l) > k for some i
(by assumption), then |Xi|+ p−i (l) > k for all i, and consequently, p−i (l) > 0 for all i (since
|Xi| ≤ k for all i). Since p−i (l) is non-decreasing in l for all i, then |Xi| + p−i > k for all i,
or equivalently, p−i > |X i| for all i. Thus,
∑
i∈N
p−i >
∑
i∈N
|X i|,
and consequently,
rN >
∑
i∈N
|X i|
since ∑
i∈N
p−i =
∑
i∈N
p+i = rN .
This is, however, a contradiction since
rN ≤ min
i∈N
|X i|+max
i∈N
|X i|
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(by the result of [4, Lemma 3]), and consequently,
rN ≤
∑
i∈N
|X i|.
Thus, |X i| ≥ p−i (l) for all i and all l, and particularly, |X i| ≥ p−i for all i. This completes
the proof.
Lemma 7. (r, p) is feasible.
Proof. Take an arbitrary S such that RS 6= ∅ (i.e., all users in S can achieve omniscience
together). By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3, it suffices to show that
∑
i∈S
p−i ≤ r˜S
for all r˜ ∈ RS . Run Algorithm 2 over the set S, and denote by (r˜, p˜) the output. Let
Y˜ = {y˜1, . . . , y˜r˜S} and V˜ = {v˜1, . . . , v˜r˜S} be the set of all packets being transmitted from
the round 1 to the round r˜S and their encoding vectors, respectively. Note that r˜S is the
minimum sum-rate that all users in S can achieve omniscience (by Lemma 4). Assume,
without loss of generality, that |X1| ≤ |X2| ≤ · · · ≤ |Xn|. Define i? , mini∈S i, and
S? , {i?, . . . , n}. Since S ⊆ S?, thenRS? 6= ∅ (i.e., all users in S? can achieve omniscience
together). Moreover, run Algorithm 2 over the set S?, and denote by (r?, p?) the output.
Note that p?S? = r
?
S? (by the result of Lemma 6). Let Y
? = {y?1, . . . , y?r?
S?
} and V ? =
{v?1, . . . , v?r?
S?
} be the set of all packets being transmitted from the round 1 to the round r?S?
and their encoding vectors, respectively.
First, we show that
r?S? ≤ r˜S.
To do so, it suffices to show that all users in S?\S achieve omniscience after the reception of
all packets in Y˜ . The proof follows by contradiction. Consider an arbitrary user i ∈ S? \ S.
Suppose that the user i does not achieve omniscience after the reception of all packets in
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Y˜ , i.e., dim(Ui ∪ V˜ ) < k. Since dim(Ui) ≥ dim(Ui?) and dim(Ui?) ≥ k − r˜S , then
dim(Ui) ≥ k − r˜S . Thus, there exists some round l such that the encoding vector v˜l of the
packet y˜l being transmitted by some user t ∈ S is in the knowledge set of the user i prior to
the round l, i.e.,
span(Ut) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ {v˜1, . . . , v˜l−1}),
and consequently,
span(Ut ∪ {v˜1, . . . , v˜l−1}) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ {v˜1, . . . , v˜l−1}).
Thus,
span(Ut ∪ V˜ ) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ V˜ ).
Since dim(Ut ∪ V˜ ) = k and dim(Ui ∪ V˜ ) ≥ dim(Ut ∪ V˜ ), then dim(Ui ∪ V˜ ) = k. This is,
however, a contradiction since dim(Ui ∪ V˜ ) < k (by assumption). Thus, all users in S? \ S
achieve omniscience after the reception of all packets in Y˜ , and so, r?S? ≤ r˜S .
Next, we show that ∑
i∈S?
p−i ≤ p?S? .
If S? = N , then ∑
i∈S?
p−i = pN = rN = r
?
N = p
?
N = p
?
S? .
Now assume that S? 6= N . If for some l, the packet y?l being transmitted by the user t ∈ S?
does not increase the size of knowledge of the user i ∈ N \ S? such that dim(Ui ∪ V ?) < k,
then
span(Ut) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ {v?1, . . . , v?l−1}),
and consequently,
span(Ut ∪ {v?1, . . . , v?l−1}) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ {v?1, . . . , v?l−1}).
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Thus,
span(Ut ∪ V ?) ⊆ span(Ui ∪ V ?).
Since dim(Ut ∪ V ?) = k and dim(Ui ∪ V ?) ≥ dim(Ut ∪ V ?), then dim(Ui ∪ V ?) = k. This
yields a contradiction since dim(Ui ∪ V ?) < k (by assumption). Thus, the packet y?l (for
any l) increases the size of knowledge of all users in N \S? that do not achieve omniscience
after the reception of all packets y?1, . . . , y
?
r?
S?
.
Since the size of knowledge of each user i ∈ N\S? after the reception of all packets in Y ?
is min{|Xi|+r?S? , k}, then the user i needs k−min{|Xi|+r?S? , k} (≤ k−min{|X1|+r?S? , k})
more packets to achieve omniscience. Thus, if the users in S? continue to make transmissions
after they all achieve omniscience, all users inN \S? achieve omniscience after the reception
of at most k −min{|X1| + r?S? , k} more packets. Thus, all users in N achieve omniscience
with at most r?S? + k − min{|X1| + r?S? , k} total transmissions. Since rN is the minimum
sum-rate for all users in N to achieve omniscience, then
r?S? + k −min{|X1|+ r?S? , k} ≥ rN .
We consider two cases: (i) |X1|+ r?S? ≥ k, and (ii) |X1|+ r?S? < k.
In the case (i), we have
r?S? ≥ rN = pN ≥
∑
i∈S?
p−i .
In the case (ii), we have
r?S? + k − |X1| − r?S? = k − |X1| ≥ rN .
Since rN ≥ k−|X1| (otherwise, the user 1 cannot achieve omniscience), then rN = k−|X1|.
Let c , mini∈N(|Xi|+ p−i ). If c < |Xi?|, then
∑
i∈S?
p−i ≤ p?S?
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since
∑
i∈S? p
−
i = 0. Now, assume that c ≥ |Xi?|. Recall that |X1| ≤ |X2| ≤ · · · ≤ |Xi? | ≤
· · · ≤ |Xn| (by assumption). Thus, c ≥ |Xi| for all i ∈ N \ S?. Note that
∑
i∈S?
p−i = rN −
∑
i∈N\S?
(c− |Xi|)
and
p?S? = r
?
S? .
We need to show that ∑
i∈S?
p−i ≤ p?S? .
Thus it suffices to show that
rN −
∑
i∈N\S?
(c− |Xi|) ≤ r?S? .
The proof follows by contradiction. Suppose that
rN −
∑
i∈N\S?
(c− |Xi|) > r?S? .
Since rN = k−|X1| and r?S? ≥ k−|Xi?| (otherwise, the user i? cannot achieve omniscience),
then
k − |X1| −
∑
i∈N\S?
(c− |Xi|) > r?S? ≥ k − |Xi? |,
and consequently,
|Xi?| > |X1|+
∑
i∈N\S?
(c− |Xi|).
Since ∑
i∈N\S?
(c− |Xi|) = (i? − 1)c− (|X1|+ · · ·+ |Xi?−1|),
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then
|X2|+ · · ·+ |Xi?| > (i? − 1)c.
This is, however, a contradiction since c ≥ |Xi| for all i ∈ [i?] (by assumption), and so,
(i? − 1)c ≥ |X2|+ · · ·+ |Xi?|.
Thus, ∑
i∈S?
p−i ≤ p?S? .
Moreover, ∑
i∈S
p−i ≤
∑
i∈S?
p−i
since S ⊆ S? (by definition). By combining the above arguments, it then follows that
∑
i∈S
p−i ≤ r˜S,
as was to be shown.
Lemma 8. (r, p) is optimal.
Proof. The proof follows from the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 5, and hence
omitted to avoid repetition.
Lemma 9. For any optimal (r˜, p˜), we have
∑
i∈N ui(r, p) =
∑
i∈N ui(r˜, p˜) andmini∈N ui(r, p) ≥
mini∈N ui(r˜, p˜).
Proof. The proof of the first part (i.e., maximum sum-utility) is straightforward. Take an
arbitrary optimal (r˜, p˜). Since r˜N = rN and p, p˜ ∈ PN , then
∑
i∈N
ui(r˜, p˜) =
∑
i∈N
|X i| − r˜N =
∑
i∈N
|X i| − rN =
∑
i∈N
ui(r, p).
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For the proof of the second part (i.e., maximum min-utility), we need to show that
min
i∈N
ui(r˜, p˜) ≤ min
i∈N
ui(r, p)
for any optimal (r˜, p˜). Take an arbitrary optimal (r˜, p˜). Since p˜+i = r˜i (otherwise, p˜N > rN =
pN since p˜+i ≥ r˜i (by rationality of (r˜, p˜)), and so, (r˜, p˜) cannot be optimal), then ui(r˜, p˜) =
|X i| − p˜−i . Note that p˜N = pN . Let c , mini∈N(|Xi|+ p−i ). Note that |X i| − p−i = k − c if
c ≥ |Xi|, and |X i| − p−i = |X i| = k − |Xi| if c < |Xi|. Thus, ui(r, p) = k −max{c, |Xi|}
for all i ∈ N . Since |Xn| ≥ |Xi| for all i ∈ N (by assumption), then it follows that
min
i∈N
ui(r, p) = k −max{c, |Xn|}.
We consider two cases: (i) c < |Xn|, and (ii) c ≥ |Xn|.
In the case (i), mini∈N ui(r, p) = k − |Xn| = |Xn|. If p˜−n > 0, then
un(r˜, p˜) = |Xn| − p˜−n < |Xn| = min
i∈N
ui(r, p).
If p˜−n = 0, then un(r˜, p˜) = |Xn|, and consequently,
min
i∈N
ui(r˜, p˜) ≤ un(r˜, p˜) = min
i∈N
ui(r, p) = k − c.
In the case (ii), mini∈N ui(r, p) = k − c. Suppose that mini∈N ui(r˜, p˜) > mini∈N ui(r, p).
Let j ∈ N be such that |Xj| − p˜−j = mini∈N ui(r˜, p˜). Thus, |Xj| − p˜−j > k − c. Since
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|X i| − p˜−i ≥ |Xj| − p˜−j for all i ∈ N , then |X i| − p˜−i > k − c. Thus,
∑
i∈N
|X i| −
∑
i∈N
p˜−i =
∑
i∈N
|X i| − p˜N
=
∑
i∈N
|X i| − r˜N
=
∑
i∈N
|X i| − rN
= nk −
∑
i∈N
|Xi| − rN
> nk − nc,
or equivalently, (
∑
i∈N |Xi|+ rN)/n < c. Since c = mini∈N(|Xi|+ p−i ) (by definition) and
c ≥ |Xn| (by assumption), then it is easy to see that c = (
∑
i∈N |Xi| + rN)/n. This is a
contradiction since (
∑
i∈N |Xi|+ rN)/n < c. Thus, mini∈N ui(r˜, p˜) ≤ mini∈N ui(r, p). This
completes the proof.
3.4 Simulations
In this section, we evaluate the effect of changing the number of users and number of
packets on various statistical parameters in the random packet distribution setting. We as-
sume that each packet would be present, independently from other users and other packets,
at each user, with probability 0 < p < 1. All the following simulations assume that the
users are following our two algorithms, described previously in this thesis. In the following
simulations, we consider three different settings: total of 4 users and 8 packets, total of 6
users and 8 packets, and total of 6 users and 10 packets. We have simulated for the following
statistical parameters: mini∈N(p−i ), maxi∈N(p
−
i ), mini∈N(ui), vari∈N(p
+
i ),
∑
i∈N(ri), and
avgi∈N(ui).
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Figure 3.5: mini∈N(p−i )
Figure 3.6: maxi∈N(p−i )
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Figure 3.7: mini∈N(ui)
Figure 3.8: vari∈N(p+i )
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Figure 3.9:
∑
i∈N(ri)
Figure 3.10: vari∈N(p−i )
We can observe in the graphs corresponding to mini∈N(ui) and
∑
i∈N(ri) that the values
have a decreasing trend as the value of p increases. This can be attributed to the fact that with
more number of packets available with the users from the beginning, there is lesser need of
the number of transmissions to make all the users complete. Less transmissions eventually
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result in lesser exchange of money too, which when combined with fewer (ri), can take a
negative hit on the value of (ui).
We have calculated the 95% confidence intervals for each statistical parameter for each
each probability point for the setting where there are a total of 4 users and 8 packets. Below
are the values:
For p = 0.1,
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
maxi∈N(p−i ) 2.5708± 0.00454 3.2924± 0.00839
mini∈N(p−i ) 1.4043± 0.00399 0.6383± 0.00797
vari∈N(p−i ) 0.33± 0.00797 1.6763± 0.00395
mini∈N(ui) 2.6941± 0.06766 3.4457± 0.00683
vari∈N(p+i ) 2.0279± 0.00406∑
i∈N(ri) 7.9336± 0.00406∑
i∈N(ri), and vari∈N(p
+
i ) are same for both algorithms.
For p = 0.15,
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
maxi∈N(p−i ) 2.6034± 0.0051 3.2598± 0.0089
mini∈N(p−i ) 1.3419± 0.00418 0.6348± 0.00791
vari∈N(p−i ) 0.3885± 0.00478 1.6712± 0.0157
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mini∈N(ui) 2.5544± 0.00784 3.2565± 0.00714
vari∈N(p+i ) 2.0588± 0.0217∑
i∈N(ri) 7.7967± 0.00607
For p = 0.20,
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
maxi∈N(p−i ) 2.6056± 0.00642 3.2119± 0.0093
mini∈N(p−i ) 1.2785± 0.00429 0.6126± 0.0078
vari∈N(p−i ) 0.4358± 0.00564 1.6561± 0.0161
mini∈N(ui) 2.4256± 0.00793 3.0842± 0.00734
vari∈N(p+i ) 2.0525± 0.0217∑
i∈N(ri) 7.6064± 0.00781
For p = 0.25,
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
maxi∈N(p−i ) 2.5912± 0.00729 3.1643± 0.00975
mini∈N(p−i ) 1.2036± 0.00439 0.5518± 0.00767
vari∈N(p−i ) 0.4824± 0.00646 1.6735± 0.0163
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mini∈N(ui) 2.2758± 0.00802 2.9044± 0.00761
vari∈N(p+i ) 2.0719± 0.0221∑
i∈N(ri) 7.3656± 0.00932
For p = 0.30,
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
maxi∈N(p−i ) 2.5604± 0.00806 3.1152± 0.0102
mini∈N(p−i ) 1.13± 0.00438 0.4868± 0.00742
vari∈N(p−i ) 0.5214± 0.00736 1.6989± 0.0166
mini∈N(ui) 2.1374± 0.00803 2.7339± 0.00782
vari∈N(p+i ) 2.0402± 0.022∑
i∈N(ri) 7.0984± 0.0104
For p = 0.35,
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
maxi∈N(p−i ) 2.5208± 0.00871 3.0488± 0.0107
mini∈N(p−i ) 1.0478± 0.0.0136 0.4188± 0.00842
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vari∈N(p−i ) 00.5576± 0.00803 1.7064± 0.0167
mini∈N(ui) 1.9776± 0.0115 2.0087± 0.00216
vari∈N(p+i ) 2.0087± 0.0216∑
i∈N(ri) 6.7999± 0.0115
For p = 0.40,
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
maxi∈N(p−i ) 2.4545± 0.00935 2.968± 0.0111
mini∈N(p−i ) 0.9662± 0.0.0436 0.3693± 0.00666
vari∈N(p−i ) 00.5862± 0.0088 1.6929± 0.0168
mini∈N(ui) 1.8178± 0.00801 2.3507± 0.00824
vari∈N(p+i ) 1.9551± 0.0255∑
i∈N(ri) 6.456± 0.0123
For p = 0.45,
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
maxi∈N(p−i ) 2.3939± 0.0098 2.8741± 0.0113
mini∈N(p−i ) 0.8741± 0.0.0428 0.3202± 0.00618
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vari∈N(p−i ) 0.6108± 0.00932 1.6564± 0.0166
mini∈N(ui) 1.6464± 0.00784 1.9037± 0.0207
vari∈N(p+i ) 1.9037± 0.0207∑
i∈N(ri) 6.1070± 0.013
For p = 0.50,
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
maxi∈N(p−i ) 2.3028± 0.0102 2.7565± 0.0115
mini∈N(p−i ) 0.7942± 0.0.0409 0.2733± 0.00564
vari∈N(p−i ) 0.6167± 0.00988 1.5934± 0.0165
mini∈N(ui) 1.489± 0.00755 1.9557± 0.00802
vari∈N(p+i ) 1.8152± 0.02∑
i∈N(ri) 5.7323± 0.0134
Above are the values for 95% confidence interval till p = 0.5, similarly we can calculate
the values for 95% confidence interval for higher values of p.
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4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
4.1 Conclusion
We considered the problem of peer-to-peer data exchange in a lossless broadcast setting.
Our goal was to ensure the stability of the grand coalition under which it is guaranteed that
all users obtain complete information at the end of the exchange process, with there being no
incentive for any subset of users to break away on their own. The previous work done with
the same motive of stabilizing the CDE had a non-monetary mechanism and was not able to
ensure stability in all problem instances. The key novelty of our framework was the design
of monetary mechanism that not only ensures stability, but also maximize the social good of
the system as a whole. The selfish nature of the users and the exchange of money, in lieu
of transmissions, to ensure stability, provides a solid foundation for its pragmatic use in real
wireless networks.
4.2 Future Work
Future research work can take multiple directions. In our current CDE setup, we consider
only integer packets or a random linear combination of linear packets. It will be interesting to
find out a polynomial-time algorithm for CDE. Present literature only provides for a Linear
Program to solve a CDE but no algorithm. If successful, we can then try to find a stable
solution for grand coalition with fractional packets too. Also, the current problem has a
fixed instance and the initial packets corresponding to each user do not change. Further
work can be done for a setting where, after a fixed duration of time, a set of packet is added
to the present knowledge of each user. This could represent a practical situation where the
packets are continuously transferred from the base station to the mobile devices, whereas
the mobile devices are also broadcasting coded or uncoded packets among themselves. In
the present setup, we have considered the users to be selfish but truthful, where they declare
actual set of packets to the other users. This could be changed to a setting where the users
36
are not truthful and an algorithm has to be developed which ensures that being truthful is the
best strategy for the users (gives them maximum utility).
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